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This paper estimates a simple New Keynesian model of the U.S. economy,
allowing for indeterminacy, over the period following the 2001 slump, an episode
for which the adequacy of monetary policy is intensely debated. We nd that
only when measuring ination with core PCE does monetary policy appear
to have been su¢ ciently active to rule out indeterminacy. We then relax the
assumption that ination in the model is measured by a single indicator and
re-formulate the articial economy as a factor model where the theorys con-
cept of ination is the common factor to the empirical ination series. CPI
and PCE provide better indicators of the latent concept while core PCE is
less informative. Finally, we estimate an extended economy that distinguishes
between core and headline ination rates. This model comfortably rules out
indeterminacy and conrms the view that the Federal Reserve put more weight
on core PCE ination when setting the policy rate during this period.
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1 Introduction
It has become prevalent to think of monetary policy in terms of nominal interest
rate feedback rules. In certain situations, for example, loose monetary policy, these
rules may introduce indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria into otherwise stable eco-
nomic environments. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and many others suggest that,
empirically, such sunspots-based instability was conned to the seventies and that
the post-Volcker years can ostensibly be characterized by determinacy. The current
paper extends this analysis to more recent data leading up to the Great Recession.
The issue of loose monetary policy during the 2000s is closely related to Taylor
(2007, 2012), who asserts that the Federal Reserve kept the policy rate too low for
too long following the recession of 2001. While Taylor does not touch the issue of
indeterminacy, he nevertheless argues that this loose policy created an environment
that ultimately brought the economy close to the brink. To bolster his thesis of an
extra easy monetary policy, Taylor constructs an articial path for the Federal Funds
rate that follows his proposed rule. He characterizes this counterfactual rates loose
tting to the actual rate as
"[...] the biggest deviation, comparable to the turbulent 1970s." [Taylor,
2007, 2]
His view is disputed by many. Amongst them, Bernanke (2010) argues that Tay-
lors use of the headline consumer price index (CPI) to measure ination in the Federal
Reserves reaction function is misleading. In fact, the Federal Reserve switched the
ination measures that inform its monetary policy deliberations several times over
the last two decades. In particular, it moved away from the CPI to the personal con-
sumption expenditure deator (PCE) in early 2000. In turn, PCE was abandoned
midway through 2004 in favor of the core PCE deator (which excludes food and
energy prices).1 Bernanke (2015) revisits Taylors exercise and constructs his own
counterfactual Federal Funds rate using core PCE. Bernankes verdict of the Federal
Reserves policy during the 2000s is inimical to Taylors and he says that
"[...] the predictions of my updated Taylor rule and actual Fed policy
are generally quite close over the past two decades. In particular, it is no
1See Mehra and Sawhney (2010).
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longer the case that the actual funds rate falls below the predictions of
the rule in 2003-2005." [Bernanke, 2015]
Our paper sheds further light on this debate. It takes as a point of departure Tay-
lors claim of an analogy between the 1970s and the 2000s as well as one of the key
recommendations for monetary policy that has emanated from New Keynesian mod-
elling: interest rates should react strongly to ination movements to not destabilize
the economy. Phrased alternatively, if the central banks response to ination is tuned
too passively in a Taylor rule sense, multiplicity and endogenous instability may arise.
In fact, the U.S. economy of the 1970s can be well represented by an indeterminate
version of the New Keynesian model as was shown by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
Along these lines, the current paper turns Taylors too low for too long story into
questioning whether the Federal Reserve operated on the indeterminacy side of the
rule after the 2001 slump. Knowledge about the economys regime is important for
policymakers because indeterminacy introduces sunspots and alters the propagation
of fundamental shocks. Thus, for central banks to use models for policy analysis, a
good understanding about the presence of (in-)determinacy is vital.
The empirical plausibility of a link between monetary policy and macroeconomic
instability was rst established by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). They estimate
variants of the Taylor rule and their research suggests that the Federal Reserves
policy may have steered the economy into an indeterminate equilibrium during the
1970s. Yet, they also nd that the changes to policy which have taken place after
1980 essentially a more aggressive response to ination brought about a stable and
determinate environment. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) reinforce this point but they
refrain from using a single equation approach. They recognize that indeterminacy is a
property of a rational expectations system and apply Bayesian estimation techniques
to a general equilibrium model. Their results parallel the earlier ndings that the
U.S. economy veered from indeterminacy to determinacy around 1980  largely as
the result of a more aggressive response of monetary policy towards ination.
Moreover, this monetary policy change had perhaps an even greater inuence
on the economy: the transformation from the Great Ination of the 1970s to the
Great Moderation is often conjoined to the conduct of monetary policy.2 Yet, the
2See, for example, Benati and Surico (2009), Bernanke (2012), Coibion and Gorodnichenko
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Great Moderation came to an end sometime during the 2000s, and it was followed by
enormous economic volatility. Our aim is to examine the possible connection between
this transformation and an alteration in the Federal Reserves monetary policy. In
particular, we concentrate on the e¤ects of a possibly too easy monetary policy after
the 2001 slump. We frame our analysis from the perspective of (in-)determinacy and
conduct it under the umbrella of the Bernanke versus Taylor dispute by considering
the measures of ination that repeatedly occur in the discussion: CPI, PCE and core
PCE.
Accordingly, we estimate a small-scale New Keynesian model allowing for indeter-
minacy over the period between the 2001 slump and the onset of the Great Recession,
thus, the NBER-dated 2002:I-2007:III window to be precise. To test for indetermi-
nacy, we employ the method of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) to compute the posterior
probabilities of determinacy and indeterminacy. We take as starting point the same
basic New Keynesian model, priors and observables as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
This strategy allows us to create a continuity between their and our results, which is
important given the shortness of our period of interest.
We establish a number of new insights regarding recent U.S. monetary policy.
For example, we can indeed expose a violation of the Taylor principle for most of
the 2000s when using CPI to measure ination. This nding supports the visual
inspection checks based on single equations in Taylor (2012) who coined the phrase
Great Deviation to refer to this period. Hence, the 2002:I to 2007:III period would
appear to be best described by an indeterminate version of the New Keynesian model.
Our upshot is di¤erent when basing the analysis on PCE data: we can neither rule
in nor rule out indeterminacy. Finally, the evidence in favor of indeterminacy alto-
gether vanishes when we use core PCE. Monetary policy then appears to have been
quite appropriate. This conclusion parallels the insight from Bernankes (2015) coun-
terfactual Federal Funds rate. We thus establish that tests for indeterminacy are
susceptible to the data used in the estimation.
We next consider whether our results are an artifact of the six year sample of data.
To address this issue, we re-estimate the model on rolling windows of xed length (23
(2011), Arias, Ascari, Branzoli and Castelnuovo (2014) and Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe
(2015).
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quarters to match the length of the 2002:I-2007:III period) starting in the mid-1960s
and focussing on the same ination measure as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) namely
CPI ination. The outcomes of the indeterminacy test performed on rolling windows
are highly plausible. In particular, we identify only two broad periods (i.e. several
consecutive windows) in which a passive policy has likely led to indeterminacy: the
1970s and the post-2001 period. The rst period, which coincides with the span of the
Burns and Miller chairmanships, exactly matches the indeterminacy duration, as well
as the timing of the switch to determinacy in 1980, that Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) document. We take this analogy as a reassuring validation of our small sample
approach, i.e. even though our period of interest is quite short, it is possible to infer
meaningful information from it.3
We then attend the issue of how best to measure ination in the New Keynesian
model. We tackle the ambiguity between the theoretical concept and the empirical
ination proxies by employing the DSGE-factor methodology proposed by Boivin
and Giannoni (2006). Accordingly, we combine various measures of ination in the
measurement equation and re-estimate our model. CPI and PCE emerge as better
indicators of the concept of ination than core PCE and indeterminacy cannot be
ruled out.
However, the nding that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out may hinge on the
fact that the baseline three-equations New Keynesian model features a single concept
of ination. To address this question, we nally turn toward an articial economy
that distinguishes explicitly between core and headline ination. We nd that the
Federal Reserve was responding mainly to core PCE and was su¢ ciently active to
comfortably rule out indeterminacy.
Perhaps most closely related to our work are Belongia and Ireland (2016) who,
like us, evaluate monetary policy during the 2000s.4 Belongia and Ireland (2016)
estimate a time-varying VAR to track the evolution of the Federal Reserves behavior
throughout the 2000s. They nd evidence of a change in the Federal Reserves behav-
ior away from stabilizing ination towards stabilizing output and also of persistent
3Judd and Rudebusch (1998) is another example of an evaluation of monetary policy over similarly
short sample periods.
4See Fackler and McMillin (2015), Fitwi, Hein and Mercer (2015), Groshenny (2013) and Jung
and Katayama (2014) for related exercises.
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deviations from the estimated policy rule. While similar in spirit to our results they
do not address issues of indeterminacy.
Bianchi (2013) examines the Federal Reserves policy post-WWII taking a Markov
switching rational expectations approach with two monetary policy regimes (i.e.
Hawk and Dove). Bianchi characterizes monetary policy in the early 2000s as Hawk-
ish and identies a switch to a Dove regime after 2005. His approach to deal with
the issue of passive monetary policy is by requiring a linear representation of the
Markov switching model to have a unique solution. Phrased alternatively, the regime
transitions do not imply moving from determinacy to indeterminacy as both regimes
are determinate. Hence, Bianchis model cannot address questions involving sunspot
equilibria as in our paper.
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows. The next section sketches the
baseline model and its solution. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy and
baseline results. Robustness checks are conducted in section 4. Section 5 relaxes the
assumption that model ination is properly measured by a single empirical indicator.
In section 6 we consider an economy that features more than one ination rate.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Baseline model
The familiar three linearized equations summarize our basic New Keynesian model:
yt = Etyt+1   (Rt   Ett+1) + gt  > 0 (1)
t = Ett+1 + (yt   zt)  > 0; 0 <  < 1 (2)
Rt = RRt 1 + (1  R)( t +  y [yt   zt]) + R;t 0  R < 1: (3)
Here yt stands for output, Rt denotes the nominal interest rate and t symbolizes
ination. Et represents the expectations operator. Equation (1) is the dynamic
IS relation reecting an Euler equation. Equation (2) describes the expectational
Phillips curve. Finally, equation (3) represents monetary policy, i.e. a Taylor-type
rule in which   > 0 and  y > 0 are chosen by the central bank and echo its
responsiveness to ination and the output gap, yt   zt. The term R;t denotes an
exogenous monetary policy shock whose standard deviation is given by R. The
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other fundamental disturbances involve exogenous shifts of the Euler equation which
are captured by the process gt and shifts of the marginal costs of production captured
by zt. Both variables follow AR(1) processes:
gt = ggt 1 + g;t 0 < g < 1
and
zt = zzt 1 + z;t 0 < z < 1:
We denote by g and z the standard deviations of the innovations g;t and z;t.
Finally, the term g;z denotes the correlation between the demand and supply inno-
vations. Then, the vector of model parameters entails
 

 ;  y; R; ; ;  ; g; z; g;z; R; g; z
0
:
Indeterminacy implies that uctuations in economic activity can be driven by ar-
bitrary, self-fullling changes in peoples expectations (i.e. sunspots). Concretely,
in our simple New Keynesian model, indeterminacy occurs when the central bank
passively responds to ination changes, i.e. when   < 1   y (1  ) =.
To solve the model, we apply the method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) in which case the full set of rational expectations solutions takes on the form
%t = ()%t 1 + "(;fM)"t + ()t (4)
where %t is a vector of model variables,
%t  [yt; Rt; t; Etyt+1; Ett+1; gt; zt]
0 ;
"t denotes a vector of fundamental shocks and t is a non-fundamental sunspot shock.
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The coe¢ cient matrices (), "(;fM) and () are related to the structural para-
meters of the model. The sunspot shock satises t  i:i:d:N(0; 2). Indeterminacy
can manifest itself in two ways: (i) through pure extrinsic non-fundamental shocks, t
(a.k.a sunspots), disturbing the economy and (ii) through a¤ecting the propagation
mechanism of fundamental shocks via fM.





Table 1 - Priors and posteriors of DSGE parameters.
Priors Posterior Mean
[5th pct, 95th pct]




































































































Notes: The inverse gamma priors are of the form p (j; &) 1   1e 
&2
22 ,
where  = 4 and & equals 0:25; 0:3; 0:6 and 0:2, respectively. The prior
predictive probability of determinacy is 0.527.
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3 Estimation and baseline results
3.1 Data and priors
We employ Bayesian techniques for estimating the parameters of the model and test
for indeterminacy using posterior model probabilities. The measurement equation
relating the elements of %t to the three observables, xt, is given by
xt =
24 0r + 

35+
24 1 0 0 0 0 0 00 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0 0
35 %t (5)
where  and r are the annualized steady-state ination and real interest rates re-
spectively. Equation (4) and (5) provide a state-space representation of the linearized
model that allows us to apply standard Bayesian estimation techniques. The technical
appendix provides further details.
We use HP-ltered per capita real GDP and the Federal Funds Rate as our ob-
servable for output and the nominal interest rate. These choices follow Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and make our baseline empirical analysis comparable to theirs
in all dimensions but the sample period. To draw up our analysis in the Bernanke
versus Taylor debate, we consider in turn three di¤erent measures of ination: CPI,
PCE deator and core PCE (all expressed in annualized percentage changes from the
previous quarter). The data covers the period between the 2001 slump and the onset
of the Great Recession, i.e. 2002:I to 2007:III.
Table 1 reports our baseline priors which are identical to the ones in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and imply a prior predictive probability of determinacy equal to
0:527. Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) we replace fM in equation (4) with
M() +M where M  [MR ;Mg ;Mz ]0. We select M() such that the responses
of the endogenous variables to fundamental shocks are continuous at the boundary
between the determinacy and the indeterminacy regions. We set the prior mean for
M equal to zero.
3.2 Testing for indeterminacy
For each measure of ination, we estimate the model over the two di¤erent regions
of the parameter space, i.e. determinacy and indeterminacy. To assess the quality of
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the models t to the data we present marginal data densities and posterior model
probabilities for both parametric zones. We approximate the data densities using
Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean estimator. Table 2 reports our results.
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Taylor (2007, 2012), we begin by us-
ing headline CPI to measure ination. In this case, the data favors the indeterminate
model: the posterior probability of indeterminacy is 0.90. This result suggests that
Taylors characterization of monetary policy in the aftermath of the 2001 slump as
too low for too long is in fact consistent with indeterminacy and the view that the
Federal Reserve has potentially veered the economy into instability.
Table 2: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Ination measure Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
CPI -95.48 -93.28 0.10 0.90
PCE -85.42 -85.75 0.58 0.42
Core PCE -64.60 -71.58 1 0
Notes: According to the prior distributions, the probability of determinacy is 0.527.
Yet, the upshot di¤ers depending on which measure of ination we employ in the
estimation. Take Bernankes (2015) suggestion that Taylors counterfactual exper-
iment should have been performed with core PCE. When making this choice, the
posterior probability for our sample concentrates all of its mass in the determinacy
region. This result ags that the Federal Reserve had not been responding passively
to ination during this period. However, the Humphrey-Hawkins reports to Congress
document that the Federal Reserve based monetary policy deliberations on headline
PCE from the beginning of 2000 until mid-2004. Since Taylor is particularly critical
of the monetary policy from 2002 to 2004, we next measure ination using headline
PCE data. We repeat the estimation and the nding is now ambiguous: the proba-
bility of determinacy is 0.58. Phrased alternatively, we cannot dismiss the possibility
of indeterminacy.
Table 1 reports the posterior estimates of the parameters for the model speci-
cation favored under CPI and core PCE respectively.6 The estimated policy rules
6The appendix reports results for parameter estimates when using headline PCE ination data.
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response to ination,  , which essentially governs the indeterminacy, di¤ers signi-
cantly depending on the way we measure ination. In particular, when basing the esti-
mation on CPI, the posterior mean equals 0:84 (with 90-percent interval [0:61; 0:98]).
This result indicates that monetary policy violated the Taylor principle over the
2002-2007 period or in the words of Taylor:
"[t]he responsiveness appears to be at least as low as in the late 1960s
and 1970s." [Taylor, 2007, 8]
The opposite result ensues when using core PCE. In that case, the posterior mean
of   is well above one at 3:01 (with 90-percent interval [1:97; 4:17]).
3.3 How important are sunspots and what drives the results?
Indeterminacy can manifest itself by a¤ecting the propagation of fundamental shocks
as well as introducing sunspot shocks. Given our above results, the question of how
important sunspot uctuations were during the 2000s comes up naturally. To answer
this question, we study the propagation of shocks and the unconditional forecast
error variance decomposition. A more detailed analysis can be found in the Appendix.
Based on our estimation using CPI data, sunspots played only a marginal role with the
most signicant contribution being seven to eight percent in explaining the variances
of the policy rate and ination. However, indeterminacy qualitatively altered the
propagation of demand shocks by changing the sign of the ination response.
In sum, we nd that indeterminacy outcomes are dependent on the ination mea-
sure that is used. What is the intuition behind this result and which features of the
data stand behind it? Headline ination generally tends to be more volatile than core
ination that excludes the most volatile components, particularly in periods of per-
sistent commodity price shocks. In fact, CPI and PCE are both more volatile than
core PCE during our period of interest. This volatility feature of the data partly
drives our ndings through its inuence on the estimates of the Taylor rule. With
core PCE as the preferred measure of ination, the monetary authority reacts to
relatively small movements in ination. In that case, any policy response to ination
has to be substantially larger for the estimation procedure to t the Federal Funds
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rate data. In contrast, when measuring ination with CPI, the estimated responsive-
ness to ination turns out to be smaller due to the larger uctuations of the ination
gap. As monetary policy fails to guarantee a unique rational expectations equilibrium
whenever it is insu¢ ciently active with respect to ination, the posterior probability
of indeterminacy is higher with headline than with core ination.
Beyond the di¤erence in the volatility of the ination measures, another feature
of the data that drives our (in)-determinacy results is a disconnect between core and
headline ination in face of persistent commodity price shocks. Our estimation based
on CPI suggests that indeterminacy primarily a¤ects the propagation of demand
shocks. In particular, the parameterMg redirects the transmisson of this disturbance,
making it look similar to a cost-push shock. This mix of disturbances helps the model
t the joint behavior of headline ination (especially CPI), real activity and monetary
policy during the 2002-2007 episode.
4 Sensitivity analysis
We now investigate the sensitivity of our results in various directions. The robustness
checks involve testing for indeterminacy on rolling windows and alternative measures
of output as well as using real-time data.7
We conduct further robustness checks that involve (i) estimating the policy para-
meters only, (ii) alternative priors for  , (iii) alternative measure of ination, (iv)
serially correlated monetary policy shocks, and (v) trend ination. For all these tests,
our results remain unchanged.
Rolling windows The size of our sample is undeniably short. So rst and foremost,
we want to assess the extent to which our results might be an artifact of the small
sample. To do so, we re-estimate the model on rolling windows starting in the mid-
1960s, and keeping the size of the windows xed at 23 quarters to match the number
of observations in our period of interest. Thus the rst window is 1966:I-1971:III. We
move the window forward one quarter at a time, and re-estimate all parameters each
7The Appendix conducts additional robustness checks that involve estimating the policy parame-
ters only; alternative priors for  ; an alternative measure of ination; serially correlated monetary
shocks; trend ination. Our results are robust to all these extensions.
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time.8 Here we just consider CPI ination as the Federal Reserve only began to base
its monetary policy deliberations on PCE and core PCE in the 2000s. Moreover, do-
ing so makes our results directly comparable to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Figure
1 presents the evolution of the posterior probability of determinacy for the U.S. econ-
omy from 1966:I to 2008:III. The end point is chosen to avoid obvious complications
that emanate from hitting the zero lower bound. The graph suggests that the U.S.
economy was likely in a state of indeterminacy during the 1970s. Thereafter, begin-
ning with the Volcker disination policies, the economy shifted back to a determinate
equilibrium. These ndings are consistent with related studies such as Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011).9 We take this correspondence as a justication for estimating our model on a
short window.10 Our paper documents a second shift after the 2001 slump now from
determinacy to indeterminacy.
8This approach to estimate linear DSGE models was recently promoted by Canova (2009), Canova
and Ferroni (2011a) and Castelnuovo (2012a,b). Rolling window estimation provides two benets. It
allows us to uncover time-varying patterns of the models parameters, in particular, of the monetary
policy coe¢ cients. At the same time, the procedure permits us to remain within the realm of linear
models and apply standard Bayesian methods.
9Figure 1 is comparable to Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011, Figure 4). They report a moving
average of the probability of determinacy which makes their series smoother than ours. Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2011) use a model with trend ination. We explore such model in the Appendix.
10We furthermore experimented with the window length and the results appear to be robust.
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Figure 1: Probability of determinacy using rolling window estimation. The gure
plots the probability at the rst quarter of a window.
Alternative measures of output To make our baseline analysis comparable with
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we used HP-ltered real GDP per capita to measure
output uctuations. However, as argued by Canova (1998), Gorodnichenko and Ng
(2010), and Hamilton (2017) among others, HP-ltered data may induce spurious
results. Accordingly, we now consider two alternative ways to gauge real economic
activity. First, we replace the output trend extracted using the HP lter with the
Congressional Budget O¢ ces estimate of potential output as in Belongia and Ireland
(2016) and others. Table 3 suggests that, again, our results remain robust. Second, we
use output growth instead of an output gap measure. To this end, we assume that the
articial economy now features trend-stationary technology it follows a deterministic
trend as in Mattesini and Nisticò (2010) or Ascari, Castelnuovo and Rossi (2011).11
Also, we no longer estimate the intertemporal rate of substitution, 1= , and instead
set it equal to one to make the model consistent with balanced growth. Then, Table
11The measurement equation now writes obsyt = 
 +byt where obsyt is the observed growth rate
of output,  stands for the steady state growth rate and byt is the rst-di¤erenced logarithm of
detrended model output. The prior distribution of  is N (0:5; 0:1).
13
3 shows that when using output growth, the case for indeterminacy becomes even
stronger for CPI and PCE. Yet, it remains unchanged when measuring ination via
core PCE data.12
Table 3. Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (Robustness)
Log-data density Probability
Ination measure Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
CPI CBO output gap -97.89 -95.85 0.12 0.88
Output growth -93.29 -89.58 0.02 0.98
PCE CBO output gap -88.08 -88.18 0.53 0.47
Output growth -82.89 -81.80 0.25 0.75
Real-time data -83.32 -83.06 0.44 0.56
Core PCE CBO output gap -68.53 -73.63 0.99 0.01
Output growth -62.54 -67.58 1 0
Real-time data -65.85 -70.24 0.99 0.01
Real-time data One important distinction between CPI and PCE price indices
is that the former are not revised (except for seasonal adjustments), whereas the
latter go through repeated rounds of revision as more information becomes available.
In particular, the PCE-based measure of ination in Bernankes (2010) speech is a
real-time measure, which, as he argues, may exhibit considerable di¤erences relative
to the revised PCE data. Hence, like Orphanides (2004), we now take into account
that monetary policymakers make decisions based on contemporaneously available
information. Therefore, our estimation uses real-time data on output, PCE and core
PCE from the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists provided by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Table 3 conrms that our ndings remain robust:
we can condently rule out indeterminacy when basing our estimation on core PCE,
while there is a possibility that indeterminacy might have prevailed under PCE.
Further tests of robustness We conduct further robustness checks that involve
(i) estimating the policy parameters only, (ii) alternative priors for  , (iii) alternative
12Given the indicated issues with HP-ltered data and the essentially unchanged results when
employing output growth, the remainder of this paper concentrates on output growth.
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measure of ination, (iv) serially correlated monetary policy shocks, and (v) trend
ination.13 For all these tests, our main result so far that the basic New Keynesian
model provides mixed evidence about indeterminacy is robust.
5 Which measure of ination to choose?
Our baseline estimations have delivered mixed evidence regarding the probability of
indeterminacy for the 2002:I to 2007:III period. The results are consistently depen-
dent on the specic ination measure used in estimation only with core PCE series
can we comfortably rule out indeterminacy. However, each ination proxy may only
provide an imperfect indicator of the model concept. Put di¤erently, all three mea-
sures of ination may contain relevant information. In this line of thinking, we will
now depart from the assumption that model ination is measured by a single series
and draw on Boivin and Giannonis (2006) dynamic factor analysis of DSGE mod-
els.14 In a nutshell, we want to exploit the information from all the ination series in
the estimation to deliver more robust results. We treat the model concept of ination
as the unobservable common factor for which data series are imperfect proxies. More
concretely, the estimation involves the transition equation (4)
%t = ()%t 1 + "(;fM)"t + ()t























Here GDPt stands for the growth rate of per-capita real GDP, FFRt denotes the
Federal Funds rate, Xt  [CPIt;PCEt;corePCEt;DEFt]0 is the vector of
13In the model with trend ination, it is no longer possible to analytically derive the indeterminacy
conditions. Hence, we follow Hiroses (2014) numerical solution strategy for nding the boundary
between determinacy and indeterminacy by perturbing the parameter   in the monetary policy
rule (see also Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008).
14Canova and Ferroni (2011b) and Castelnuovo (2013) are recent applications.
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empirical ination proxies,15  =diag(CPI ; PCE; corePCE; DEF ) is a 44 diagonal
matrix of factor loadings relating the latent model concept of ination to the four
indicators, t  4[t; t; t; t]0 and ut = [uCPIt ; uPCEt ; ucorePCEt ; uDEFt ]0  i:i:d:(0;)
is a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated indicator-specic measurement er-






DEF ). We jointly estimate the parameters
(;) of the measurement equation (6) along with the structural parameters . We
calibrate  equal to 2.5 percent - a value roughly in line with the average of the sam-
ple means of the ination series. We standardize the four indicators to have mean
zero and unit variance. This standardization permits us to interpret the factor load-
ings, js, as correlations between the latent theoretical concept of ination and the
respective observables.16 Our prior distribution for the loadings and measurement
errors are j  Beta(0:50; 0:25) and ujt  Inverse Gamma(0:10; 0:20) respectively.
By employing a beta distribution, the support of the j is restricted to the open
interval (0; 1) which is a necessary sign restriction.
Table 4 reports the resulting log-data densities which are  162:50 for determi-
nacy and  161:83 for indeterminacy. Phrased di¤erently, the posterior probabilities
of determinacy and indeterminacy are 34% versus 66%, hence, we cannot rule out
indeterminacy.17
Table 4: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (DSGE-Factor)
Log-data density Probability
Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
-162.50 -161.83 0.34 0.66
Notes: The prior predictive probability of determinacy is 0.527.
Table 5 reports the posterior estimates of the model parameters along with the
factor loadings (i.e. the correlations between the latent factor and the proxies) as
well as the standard deviations of the measurement errors. Conditional on both
determinacy and indeterminacy the loadings on CPI and PCE are about three times
15DEF is the acronym for the GDP Deator.
16See Geweke and Zhou (1996) and Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2000).
17We also replicated Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) with the DSGE factor model approach. The
outcomes of the indeterminacy test for the pre-Volcker and post-1982 sample periods remain unal-
tered to this extension.
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as large as the loading on core PCE. Furthermore, there is evidence of substantial
indicator-specic component for core PCE as evident in the high standard deviation
of its measurement error. These results imply that CPI and PCE provide better
indicators of the latent concept of ination, while core PCE, despite being promoted
by Bernanke (2015), is less informative. In other words, while core PCE might better
t the Federal Reserves behavior in isolation, the other ination measures are more
consistent with the New Keynesian model as a whole.
In sum, when taking the considered variants of the New Keynesian model, inde-
terminacy cannot be ruled out. What these model versions have in common though
is that they all feature only one measure of ination. In the next section we turn to
an economy that explicitly di¤erentiates between core and headline ination rates.
17
Table 5 - Parameter Estimation Results (DSGE-Factor)
Determinacy Indeterminacy
Mean [5th pct, 95thpct] Mean [5th pct, 95th pct]
  2.13 [1.29,3.13] 0.80 [0.61,0.98]
 y 0.30 [0.07,0.65] 0.21 [0.05,0.45]
R 0.81 [0.72,0.88] 0.81 [0.73,0.88]
r 1.00 [0.45,1.67] 1.23 [0.57,2.00]
 0.74 [0.41,1.15] 1.00 [0.57,1.49]
 0.53 [0.45,0.62] 0.51 [0.44,0.58]
g 0.79 [0.68,0.87] 0.60 [0.45,0.74]
z 0.68 [0.50,0.85] 0.70 [0.54,0.84]




R 0.18 [0.13,0.25] 0.16 [0.12,0.21]
g 0.19 [0.14,0.27] 0.28 [0.18,0.42]
z 0.69 [0.50,0.94] 0.73 [0.53,1.00]
 0.18 [0.12,0.27]
CPI 0.76 [0.55,0.93] 0.57 [0.37,0.79]
PCE 0.79 [0.59,0.95] 0.59 [0.40,0.82]
CorePCE 0.28 [0.07,0.52] 0.21 [0.06,0.40]
DEF 0.53 [0.31,0.77] 0.41 [0.23,0.64]
CPI 0.31 [0.20,0.43] 0.32 [0.22,0.43]
PCE 0.18 [0.10,0.31] 0.18 [0.10,0.29]
CorePCE 0.91 [0.72,1.14] 0.91 [0.72,1.14]
DEF 0.71 [0.56,0.90] 0.70 [0.56,0.88]
Notes: The table reports posterior means and 90 percent probability intervals
of the DSGE-Factor model parameters.
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6 An economy that distinguishes between core and
headline ination
Our baseline results on the issue of equilibrium determinacy were clearly dependent
on the particular measure of ination used in the estimation, thus leaving us with
essentially the same dilemma that Taylor and Bernanke originally posed: should we
measure ination with CPI or Core PCE? In the previous section we have attempted
to resolve this ambiguity by taking an econometric approach that draws on the DSGE-
Factor analysis. Our estimation results there suggest that, for our period of interest,
the concept of ination in the basic New Keynesian model is more strongly correlated
with broad indicators such as CPI and PCE than with narrower proxies such as core
PCE. The immediate implication of this nding is that the indeterminate version of
the model ts better than its determinate analogue.
However, the result that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out may hinge on the fact
that the three-equation New Keynesian model features a single concept of ination.
Indeed, our DSGE-Factor approach forces the central bank to respond to the exact
same measure of ination (i.e. same combination of indicators) as the one that
households consider in their consumption-spending decisions. But what (would be
the consequences for equilibrium determinacy) if the Federal Reserve was actually
focusing on core ination in its conduct of monetary policy, as claimed by Bernanke
(2015), while private-sector agents were looking at a di¤erent, broader, measure of
ination?
To address this question, we now turn toward a structural approach by employing
an articial economy that distinguishes explicitly between core and headline ination,
i.e. both ination concepts simultaneously appear in the model.
6.1 Model
The articial economy builds on Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Blanchard and Riggi
(2013) who introduce imported oil into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model.
We present the key aspects of the linearized model here and delegate the full de-
scription to the Appendix. Our exposition draws heavily on Blanchard and Gali
(2010).
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Oil is used by rms in production and by households in consumption. In partic-
ular, technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function that uses labor, nt,
and oil, mt :
qt = mt + (1  )nt 0 <  < 1 (7)
where qt stands for gross output. Similarly, nal consumption, ct, is made up of
domestically produced good, cq;t, and imported oil, cm;t:18
ct = (1  )cq;t + cm;t 0 <  < 1: (8)
Denoting the price of domestic output and the price of consumption by pq;t and pc;t
respectively, and letting pm;t be the nominal price of oil, the following relationship
arises between consumption-price ination c;t and domestic output-price ination
q;t:
c;t = q;t + st (9)
where st is the real price of oil, st  pm;t   pq;t , which is exogenous. Following
Aoki (2001) and Blanchard and Gali (2010), we interpret c;t and q;t as headline and
core ination respectively. Utility maximization by the household yields the standard
intertemporal optimality condition
ct = Etct+1 + Etzt+1  Rt + Etc;t+1 + dt   Etdt+1 (10)
and the intratemporal leisure-consumption trade-o¤
wt   pc;t = (wt 1   pc;t 1) + (1  )['nt + ct]: (11)
Here Rt denotes the nominal interest rate, dt is a discount-factor shock, zt is a shock
to the growth rate of technology, wt denotes the nominal wage and ' stands for
the inverse Frisch elasticity. The parameter  2 [0; 1] captures the extent of real
wage rigidity where larger values indicate higher degrees of rigidity. Notice in the
households Euler equation (10) that the model-consistent real interest rate that drives
consumption dynamics involves headline consumption price ination. Domestic rms
are monopolistic competitors facing nominal rigidities à la Calvo. Firms prot-
maximizing pricing decisions result in the familiar aggregate New Keynesian Phillips
18If the shares  and  are set to zero, the economy boils down to a simple three-equation New
Keynesian model, similar to the one we have used in the previous sections.
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curve which governs the dynamics of domestic-good sticky-price ination (i.e. core
ination):
q;t = Etq;t+1   t (12)
where the slope coe¢ cient   (1 )(1 )

,  denotes the probability of not being
able to reset prices,  represents the households discount factor and t is the price
markup over nominal marginal costs. Cost minimization by rms gives rise to the
following demand for oil:
mt = qt   t   st: (13)
The requirement that trade be balanced (as oil is imported) delivers the following
relationship between nal consumption and domestic output:
ct = qt   st + t (14)
where   MP  andM
P denotes the steady-state gross markup. Value added (i.e.
GDP), denoted by yt, is given by:
yt = qt +

1  st + t: (15)
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule which reacts to ination, deviations of GDP
from the balanced-growth path and the growth rate of GDP, gyt  yt   yt 1 + zt:
Rt = RRt 1 + (1  R)[ f!c;t + (1  !)q;tg+  yyt +  gygyt] + R;t
where the monetary policy shock R;t is i.i.d. N(0; 2R). Notice that the central bank
responds to a convex combination of headline and core ination (with the parameter
! governing the relative weights; setting ! to zero implies that the central bank
responds to core ination only). As we have seen, the controversy between Taylor
and Bernanke essentially boils down to the choice of the ination measure in the
monetary policy rule. By estimating !, we will let the data speak as to whether the
Federal Reserve was actually focusing on headline (Taylor, 2007) or core ination
(Bernanke, 2015). Lastly the structural disturbances st, zt, and dt are assumed to
follow independent stationary AR(1) processes:
st = sst 1 + "st zt = zzt 1 + "zt and dt = ddt 1 + "dt:
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We nd that the Taylor Principle continues to hold in the Blanchard-Gali model.19
In line with Carlstrom, Fuerst and Ghironi (2006), the indeterminacy condition is
not dependent on any particular measure of ination: as long as the central bank
sets its response coe¢ cient greater than unity to either headline or core ination (or
any convex combination of these two measures), such policy will ensure equilibrium
determinacy.
6.2 Econometric strategy and results
To address typical identication issues, we calibrate a subset of the model parameters.
We set the discount factor  to 0.99, the steady-state markup at ten percent, and
the inverse of the labor-supply elasticity ' to one. Following the computations in
Blanchard and Gali (2010) for their post-1984 sample period, we calibrate the shares
of oil in production and consumption to  = 0:012 and  = 0:017. Furthermore, we
assume that shocks to the growth rate of technology are i.i.d., i.e. z = 0. We estimate
the remaining parameters with Bayesian techniques. We use a loose Beta distribution
centered at 0:5 to place an agnostic prior on both the wage-rigidity parameter, , and
the weight on headline ination in the monetary policy rule, !. The other priors are
similar to the ones we have used in the earlier sections and are reported in Table 6.
For our purpose, the main appeal of the Blanchard-Gali model is that it o¤ers a
micro-founded distinction between core and headline ination which permits us to use
both headline and core ination data in the estimation. This approach will hopefully
resolve some of the ambiguity that characterized our previous results.
At rst, however, to maintain a continuity with our earlier ndings, we estimate
the newmodel using the exact same dataset with only three observables: the quarterly
growth rate of real GDP per-capita, the Federal Funds rate and one of two alternative
ination rates, CPI or core PCE. Since we are initially using only one ination series
at a time, the weight ! in the Taylor rule is not well identied. Hence, when using CPI
data, we calibrate this parameter to one, so that the central bank responds solely to
headline ination as in Taylor (2007). Similarly, when measuring ination with core
PCE, we set ! equal to zero, so that the monetary authority reacts to core ination
19Figure A5 in the Appendix shows the determinacy region for combinations of   with the other
policy parameters as well as with the degree of real wage rigidity .
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as Bernanke (2015) suggests. Table 6 reports the posterior estimates while Table
7 gives the log-data densities. In line with all our previous results, the estimation
favors the indeterminate version of the model whenever we use CPI data, while it
unambiguously selects determinacy under core PCE. Since we are using our original
dataset, we can compare the marginal data densities of the augmented economy with
the ones of the baseline model shown in Table 3 (the row labelled Output Growth).
The fact that these densities are of similar magnitude indicates that the additional
micro-foundations of the Blanchard-Gali model are not rejected by the data.
We can now move on to our next exercise: treating simultaneously both headline
and core ination as observables. Hence, our dataset will now include four variables.
This step enables us to properly identify the commodity-price shock as well as the
weight ! in the policy rule. First, we measure headline and core ination using PCE
and core PCE data respectively. Then, we consider CPI as the proxy for headline
ination, while still using core PCE data to measure core ination. Using CPI and
core PCE data simultaneously to estimate the model helps us tackle the controversy
between Taylor and Bernanke in a more direct way.20 Table 7 (cf. the two rows
labelled Four obs) shows that, no matter whether we measure headline ination
with PCE or CPI data, the whole posterior probability mass concentrates in the
determinacy region. Looking at Table 6 (cf. the two columns labelled Four obs),
the posterior mean of the weight on headline ination in the policy rule, !, is 0:25 with
PCE data and 0:17 when we use CPI. Our estimation results therefore provide some
empirical support for Bernankes (2015) claim that the Federal Reserve was actively
reacting to core ination (as opposed to headline) during this period. Moreover, as
anticipated, the parameters pertaining to the commodity-price shock are now better
identied: the posterior mean estimates of s and s are both signicantly higher
than the estimates we obtain when using only three observables.
A key parameter in the Blanchard and Gali (2010) model is the degree of real
wage rigidity, . To sharpen the identication of this feature, we nally add real
wage data, i.e. we ultimately employ ve observables to estimate the model. We use
20However, this combination of headline CPI and core PCE data is not ideal to measure the
theorys concepts of headline and core ination: In the model, the core deator is dened implicitly
by excluding oil (the imported commodity) from the consumers basket, without altering the weights
of others goods. Yet, the CPI and PCE price index are assembled in di¤erent ways and attach
di¤erent weights to di¤erent goods.
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observations on hourly compensation for the non-farm business sector for all persons
as a measure of nominal wages. To get real wages, we then divide this proxy by,
alternatively, the PCE or CPI price deator (depending on how we measure headline
ination). To circumvent the issue of stochastic singularity, we add a labor supply
shock, t.21 As a result, the labor supply equation (11) becomes:
wt   pc;t = (wt 1   pc;t 1) + (1  )['nt + ct] + t: (16)
Our main nding, that the data favors determinacy in this extended model, remains
unchanged. The parameter estimate of  becomes twice as large when we use real
wage data, suggesting a substantial degree of real wage rigidity. This result con-
trasts with Blanchard and Riggi (2013) who nd that real wages were highly exible
during the Great Moderation period. This divergence might be due to the di¤erent
estimation strategy we employ. While Blanchard and Riggi (2013) adopt a limited-
information approach that matches impulse responses to a commodity price shock
in the DSGE model and in a structural VAR, we use a full-information Bayesian
estimation with multiple shocks.
In summary, our estimation of the Blanchard-Gali model provides evidence that
the Federal Reserves monetary policy in the aftermath of the 2001 slump was re-
sponding mainly to core PCE and was su¢ ciently active to ensure equilibrium deter-
minacy. These results line up with Bernankes (2015) account.22
21As in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010), we normalize
the labor supply shock such that it enters the households intratemporal optimality condition with
a unit coe¢ cient. This procedure improves the identication of the standard deviation of the labor
supply disturbance and facilitates the convergence of the MCMC algorithm.
22Likewise we have estimated the model with CPI and core CPI data. Furthermore, we have also
used real-time data on per-capita real GDP growth rate, PCE and core PCE ination. Our results
remain robust and are reported in the Appendix.
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Table 6: Priors and posteriors for DSGE parameters.
Posterior Mean [5th pct, 95th pct]
Three obs Four obs Five obs
Name Priors CPI CorePCE PCE,CorePCE CPI,CorePCE PCE,CorePCE CPI,CorePCE






































































































































































































         
Mz N(0,1)  0:36
[ 0:63; 0:11]
         
MR N(0,1)  0:17
[ 1:12;0:90]
         
Ms N(0,1) 0:01
[ 0:71;0:76]
         
Md N(0,1)  1:20
[ 1:66; 0:87]
         
Notes: N stands for Normal, B Beta, G Gamma, and IG inverse gamma distribution. For each
prior distribution, the parameters in parenthesis are the mean and standard deviation.25
Table 7: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Ination measure Det. Indet. Det. Indet.
Three obs (CPI)  93:98  88:06 0 1
Three obs (CorePCE)  61:14  67:33 1 0
Four obs (PCE, CorePCE)  111:55  123:16 1 0
Four obs (CPI, CorePCE)  126:01  138:31 1 0
Five obs (PCE, CorePCE)  156:30  161:86 1 0
Five obs (CPI, CorePCE)  174:66  181:61 1 0
Notes: The prior predictive probability of determinacy is 0:51.
7 Concluding remarks
Using the Taylor rule as a benchmark for evaluating the Federal Reserves interest-
rate setting decisions, some commentators have argued that monetary policy was too
accommodative during the 2002-2005 period. Along these lines, this paper starts by
estimating a basic New Keynesian model of the U.S. economy for the time following
the 2001 slump. Our assessment of the Federal Reserves performance varies with
the measure of ination that is put into the model estimation. When measuring
ination with CPI or PCE, we nd some support for the view that monetary policy
during these years was extra easy and led to equilibrium indeterminacy. Instead,
if the estimation involves core PCE, monetary policy comes out as active and the
evidence for indeterminacy dissipates. This divergence of results remains robust to
several extensions. Our take is that each ination series only provides an imperfect
proxy for the models concept of ination. We re-formulate the articial economy as
a factor model where the theorys concept of ination is the common factor to the
alternative empirical ination series. Again, extra easy monetary policy as well as
indeterminacy cannot be ruled out. This nding, however, may hinge on the fact that
the model features a single concept of ination. Thus, we nally move to an economy
that explicitly distinguishes between headline and core ination. We nd that the
Federal Reserve was responding mainly to core PCE and was su¢ ciently active to
comfortably rule out indeterminacy.
We chose to make these arguments while staying in relatively standard models.
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This choice enables to establish a bridge from existing research to our study which we
believe is important given the short sample period that we consider. We specically
did not add asset markets to the model or in the estimation. Thus, in terms of
possible extensions, it would be worthwhile to introduce housing into the model and
in the econometric analysis. It is our intention to pursue these lines of research in
the near future.
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